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Abstract 
This paper brings new evidence on the relationship between employees' well being, sickness absence and four 
dimensions of workplace performance i.e. productivity, efficiency, quality of service and profitability. It uses a 
new panel dataset with monthly observations over two years for 48 local units of a large multi-site organisation 
in the logistics sector. It finds that good consultation and communication at the local level are associated with 
lower absenteeism. It also finds that lower absence is associated with higher efficiency, productivity, quality of 
the service and profitability of the firm. Finally, the authors suggest that the link between workers’ absence and 
this firm’s profitability runs through the increased use of replacement labour which raises short-run costs and 
reduces quality of service. 
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1. Introduction 
Absence from work due to sickness is widely believed to cost a great deal to advanced industrial 
economies. According to estimates from the British employer’s organisation, the CBI, and the 
professional organisation for Human Resource Management in Britain, the CIPD, sickness absence 
from work costs the British economy annually between £13.4bn and £16.5bn1. A similar picture 
was painted by the British government’s Black review of the health of Britain's working age 
population, which put the wider economic costs of ill-health in Britain at over £100bn a year. Like 
the CBI and the CIPD, her review stressed the role of the workplace in the nation’s health, and that 
in addition to medical services, line managers have an essential part to play. The report stressed the 
mutual gains from employer action on employee sickness. ‘Good line management can lead to good 
health, well-being and improved performance. Line managers also have a role in identifying and 
supporting people with health conditions to help them to carry on with their responsibilities, or 
adjust responsibilities where necessary’ (Black, 2008 p11). 
 In this paper, we use a new data set which includes monthly observations on sickness 
absence, performance and yearly information on workforce composition and well-being for 48 
depots of a major UK company, PFW, which operates in the logistics sector, for the period 2004-
2008.  The novelty of this dataset is that it includes detailed information on four different 
dimensions of workplace performance i.e. physical productivity, efficiency, quality of the service 
provided and profitability. Our data set also includes information from the organisation’s annual 
employee attitude survey over the period. This provides insight into employee views about their 
work, their managers, the company, and the plant level communication and consultation process. 
Over the period, the company invested a great deal of time and resources in improved absence 
management, by a mixture of health and well-being policies and better monitoring by local level 
managers who were encouraged to ‘manage not medicalise’ sickness absence. The CIPD and CBI 
surveys show that very few organisations undertake any rigorous measurement of their absence 
costs, and even when they do, they tend to adopt an accounting approach without measuring the 
impact on productivity and profitability. We were also able to conduct a number of in-depth 
interviews with local depot managers and local union representatives as well as senior managers of 
the organisation. These interviews helped us to gain some insight on the transmission mechanism 
between employees' well being, sickness absence and workplace performance within PFW (see 
Appendices 2 and 3 for details).  
                                               
1
 Based on evidence from the Confederation of British Industry the Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development, respectively, respectively Britain’s leading employer and human resource management organisations 
(CBI 2008, CIPD 2007) 
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 Our analysis of detailed performance data from a single multi-site organisation sheds new 
light on the effects of sickness absence on organisational performance, and is a step forward 
compared with previous work based on large national labour force and production data sets: In the 
first part of the present paper we address the question whether improved absence management is 
associated with a reduction of workplace absence. In particular, we analyse some of the 
determinants of depot sickness absence rates, and the relationship with employee well-being and 
local management effectiveness. In the second part we examine whether lower workplace absence 
has an effect on firms performance. We look at the effects of absence upon depot productivity, 
efficiency, profitability and the quality of the service delivered. Our results show that good 
consultation and communication at the local level, and a supportive approach to absence 
management that emphasises employee well-being is associated with lower absenteeism. We also 
find that lower absence is associated with higher efficiency, productivity, quality of the service 
provided and profitability of the firm. Finally, we suggest that direct channels exist linking workers’ 
absence to firms’ profitability through the increased use of replacement labour and the reduction of 
the quality of service provided. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the literature on the 
determinants of sickness absence and workplace performance. In section 3 we briefly describe the 
institutional characteristics of PFW and how we constructed our dataset. Section 4 provides the 
empirical analysis. In section 5 we highlight possible channels through which well-being policies 
affect workplace performance by means of a path analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Some previous research on sickness absence 
2.1 The causes and treatment of absence 
There is now a substantial body of research indicating that the kind of policies used by PFW to 
improve employee health and promote more healthy life-styles are potentially beneficial to 
organisations. Two wide-ranging literature reviews stressed a number of fairly robust conclusions 
(see Luz and Green, 1997, and Harrison and Martocchio 1998). Some aspects of people’s life-styles 
are particularly associated with higher absence rates, including smoking, heavy drinking, drug 
abuse, and lack of exercise. Physiological characteristics such as age are also influential. Harrison 
and Martocchio’s review (1998) shows that among men, absence rates tend to decline with age, but 
for women, there is no relationship. They hypothesised that this was less connected with 
physiological age than with older workers having achieved a better fit between their job preferences 
and their current jobs, and hence to greater satisfaction.  
 The scope for management policies to reduce absence is also highlighted by the evidence 
3 
that adapting work schedules can assist in promoting more reliable work attendance. According to 
the evidence reviewed by Harrison and Martocchio, working on day shifts, having flexible work-
schedules and shift patterns that fit with social routines outside work also contribute to lower 
absence. Outside caring responsibilities have been shown to be a major influence on work 
attendance. On the one hand, people with such responsibilities may also have a more responsible 
attitude to their work, but on the other, such attitudes may from time to time be overridden by the 
needs of their dependents Other research also illustrates the importance of non-work demands on 
work attendance (eg. Allen 1996). Action to improve a number of job-related issues is also 
associated with lower absence (Harrison and Martocchio, 1998). According to these authors these 
include high levels of job satisfaction, job involvement, and organizational commitment, doing 
meaningful tasks, and working in a group or a culture with strict and salient attendance norms. How 
the workplace is managed can also be influential. The usefulness of return-to-work interviews to 
reduce absence is widely supported by research evidence and managers’ experience (Krause et al., 
1998, and Crail, 2007), although there is variance between groups of employees, and much also 
depends on how managers carry them out. Likewise, the attempt to develop a more consultative, 
informative and supportive approach by local management accords with findings that this approach 
is associated with improved job satisfaction and contentment, which other studies have found to be 
related to lower absence (Deery et al., 1995, and Wood 2008). 
 Incentives and sanctions may also reduce absence and encourage attendance. Several 
psychologists and labour economists have used choice and utility maximisation models with some 
success, treating the work attendance decision as the outcome of a balance of positive and negative 
utilities (Harrison and Martocchio 1998, Barmby and Suzyrman, 2004). Within this framework, 
financial rewards for attendance, such as attendance bonuses, and experience-rated supplementary 
sick pay should raise the relative cost of absence for the employee, and so tip the balance in favour 
of attendance. Some studies suggest this is particularly relevant for the duration as opposed to the 
incidence of absence (Barmby et al 1991, Winkelmann, 1999). 
 Organisational factors can also be important, and perhaps the three most salient themes in 
the literature concern the effect of major organisational changes, the cost of absence to the 
organisation, which may vary according to its technology, and what might be called the 
organisation’s ‘absence culture’. Major organisational changes, such as restructuring at PFW, have 
been found to affect attendance, although the theoretical approaches lead to differing conclusions. 
According to one, mainly psychological, line of research employees use temporary withdrawal as a 
means of coping with the stressful events, such as downsizing and increased job insecurity (eg de 
Witte 1999). On the other hand, many labour economists would expect a period of downsizing to be 
associated with reduced absenteeism because employees with a reputation for absenteeism are 
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likely to be higher on their employer’s list of those to be made redundant. In effect, such periods 
increase the expected cost of absence to the employee thereby inducing them to choose increased 
work attendance (Allen 1981, Dionne and Dostie 2007). 
 An organisation’s technology can affect its ability to accommodate absence without harming 
overall performance. For example, absence is more costly for organisations with ‘just-in-time’ 
technologies than for more traditional bureaucratic models which use buffer stocks to ease 
adjustments. According to their situation, firms may seek to recruit employees with different 
propensities for absence by the design of their pay and benefit packages. For example, they might 
offer higher pay coupled with a strict regime on attendance, or lower pay with a more 
accommodating regime. This approach has been investigated, for example, by Allen (1983) and 
Lanfranchi and Treble (2008). It could be argued that the organisation in this case study has made 
just this transition, as just-in-time delivery has become a key part of competition for internet sales. 
This approach also has implications for the distribution of absence costs between employer and 
employee as part of the cost of the more accommodating benefit package is paid for by employees 
taking lower wages. 
 Many writers have argued that organisations develop ‘cultures’, or standards, of attendance 
and with a set of legitimate or tolerated reasons for absence. In their classic studies, Hill and Trist 
(1953 and 1955) show how such norms of mutually acceptable absence behaviour are learned by 
new employees as they observe both how management treats their own absences, and how it treats 
those of their colleagues during their first years in an organisation. Four to five years service 
appeared to be the relevant threshold in their study. Although there may be formal rules about 
absence, what matters is how management applies them in practice. Management’s treatment of 
each case is likely to establish precedents in the eyes of other employees so that workplace norms of 
absence can evolve over time as part of a process of ‘custom and practice’ in the same way that 
other work standards evolve as a form of implicit negotiation as management errors of commission 
and omission are taken to establish new precedents (Brown 1973, Edwards and Scullion 1982). A 
number of studies have also provided evidence for the effects of work group cultures on absence, 
for example, work group cohesion can have positive or negative effects on absence depending on 
job satisfaction (Drago and Wooden 1992), and absence rates have been found to increase among 
teachers when they move to high absence schools (eg Bradley et al 2007). Aspects of the ‘absence 
culture’ thinking can be found in theories of the ‘psychological contract’ which stress the role of 
employee expectations about the ‘psychological contract’ governing what are mutually acceptable 
patterns of absence behaviour at work (Nicholson and Johns 1985). Management can influence such 
norms and expectations among its employees, but it cannot change them unilaterally (Conway and 
Briner, 2005). 
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 Thus, the research literature strongly supports the contention that ‘sickness absence’ has 
many potential causes, not just strictly medical ones. From a policy point of view, this suggests that 
organisations have to apply a range of different types of policies. Promoting better health and 
fitness can address some purely medical causes, but dealing with absence cultures or renegotiating 
psychological contracts clearly involves a rather different kind of approach. It is also likely that the 
approach to one aspect of absence will interact with the others. For example, an emphasis on 
improving health may also signal to employees that their employers wish to change the 
psychological contract. Equally, it may be hard for an employer to change the psychological 
contract without emphasising the value of employee health. It may also be hard to change it without 
simultaneously adopting other measures to treat absence such as improved record-keeping and an 
active management approach to return-to-work interviews. 
2.2 The effects and costs of absence 
There is a long tradition of estimating the cost of absence. It ranges from what might be called the 
‘book’ or ‘accounting’ cost, which computes the cost of a day’s absence by adding up the cost of 
such items as pay, benefits, management time and replacement labour, and the ‘behavioural’ cost. 
The latter seeks to estimate the cost by taking into account behavioural relations within the 
organisation and in the labour market, such as those affecting productivity and the incidence of 
costs on different parties. The former generally uses information from surveys of absence, often 
carried out by management or employer organisations, such as those of the CIPD and the CBI and 
their sister organisations in other countries, and apply an estimate of the cost of a day’s absence 
(e.g. Shelly, 1993). Examples of gross costs include wages and employer contributions of absent 
workers, replacement labour, management costs, and additional spill-over costs on other workers. 
Net costs would take account of the gross costs minus the productivity of the replacement labour, 
which may be lower than that of the person absent. Indeed, as will be seen in this study, 
replacement labour was believed by managers, and appeared in the statistical analysis, to be only 
about half as productive as regular employees. Although useful to get an idea of the overall lost 
production due to absence, these calculations generally make the strong assumption that 100% 
attendance is a realistic standard by which to judge these losses. This could be moderated if those 
present but sick have reduced productivity, and it is also questionable whether a zero percent 
absence rate would be sustainable over time, and therefore an appropriate benchmark for estimating 
costs (Caverley et al, 2006). Being present but at reduced productivity because of illness, 
‘presenteeism’, is particular common for mental illness which affects large numbers of adults 
(Parsonage, 2007). Finally, although commonly reported as though absence is ‘costing business’ £x 
million pounds, this approach in fact gives no indication as to its division between employers in lost 
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production and employees in lower wages or in extra work to cover for absent colleagues. 
 An alternative approach used by some labour economists has been to use market valuations. 
Allen (1983), for example, outlines two approaches to measuring the cost of employee absences 
from work: one based on wages and the other on productivity. The idea behind the first is that firms 
for which absence costs are high will be willing to offer higher wages combined with stricter 
absence provisions, and those for which absence matters less can be more tolerant, but pay lower 
wages. In effect, the wage offered reflects the productivity that the employer expects to achieve. 
Allen then estimates wage equations for US industries, and finds that industries with higher absence 
rates pay similar workers lower wages (that is, similar in terms of such characteristics as gender, 
household size, age, job tenure, education and occupation). He found that a 10% point rise in the 
absence rate was associated with a 1.3% decrease in the wage overall, and 2.4% for production 
workers. This is evidence that some of the cost of absence is shared by employees. 
 His second approach reflects the idea that higher absence rates damage organisational 
performance, in this case, productivity. Using a standard production function model which links 
labour and capital inputs to outputs, he found that the same ten point increase in absence was 
associated with a 3.1% decline in industry productivity, which fell to 1.6% when controlling for 
industry-specific effects. Compared with the 1.3% decrease in overall wages above, this suggests 
that a substantial part of the overall cost of absence is shared with employees. Both sets of 
estimations used cross-sectional industry data for the US, and it could be argued that the real cost 
for business lies in the opportunity cost of absence, that is, the production plans that could not be 
achieved because of unreliable attendance levels. 
 Coles and Treble (1996), and Coles et al (2007) make a first step in this direction when 
exploring the implications of absence for different production technologies. What they call 
‘assembly line’ technology requires a full complement of workers without which it cannot function. 
As a result, firms with this model have to hire additional workers to ensure absences are covered, 
which reduces average worker productivity. In contrast, what they call ‘linear’ production 
technologies make less stringent demands on attendance because output varies (linearly) according 
to the number of workers present. Most organisations lie in between these two extremes, but they 
serve to highlight how firms’ technology can affect the economic cost of absence they face. In a 
more recent paper, Lanfranchi and Treble (2008) take this further by looking at use of buffers in 
order to make ‘assembly line’ technologies more robust to absence, but these also entail costs, as 
highlighted by the literature on ‘lean production’. The present study takes this a step further by 
exploring the detailed impact of absence on various dimensions of organisational performance 
across different sites. 
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3. The organisation and its data 
3.1 The organisation and its context 
The company, PFW, runs a major logistics operation across the UK working with a system of 
national sorting centres and about 50 local depots which collect and deliver items to businesses and 
to homes. A large part of the workforce is engaged in collection, sorting and delivery. The sector 
has become much more competitive in recent years as a result of postal deregulation across the EU, 
and the growth of internet sales. The parent company is strongly unionised and parts of it have long 
a tradition of robust industrial relations. 
 Between 2002 and 2004 PFW underwent a major transformation, staunching its severe 
financial losses, and rescaling and restructuring its operations towards a smaller number of higher 
value-added delivery services. By 2004, the beginning of the period of observation, it had cut its 
workforce by two-thirds, and closed over half of its local depots, and by 2005-06, it returned a 
modest, but rising, profit. In the process, it moved towards greatly improved financial health, 
establishing a platform from which it could compete in the increasingly deregulated market for 
delivery services. 
 However, the move towards greater efficiency and better financial health achieved by the 
end of its ‘Project Apollo’ was believed to lack sustainability because employee morale was low, 
and sickness absence rates were very high, the figure for the whole company being around 7% 
through much of 2004. At the time, the CBI and CIPD employer surveys of absence were reporting 
absence rates nationally of about 3-4%. 
 
3.2 The data 
Working closely with the organisation, we were able to construct a panel data set comprising 
monthly series for each depot on sickness absence rates, replacement labour, physical productivity, 
unit costs, a measure of profitability, and delivery quality of service. The company provided also 
information by depot from its annual employee attitude ‘Have Your Say’ (HYS) survey. This gave 
us information on employees’ views related to their jobs, their managers, the company as a whole, 
and the effectiveness of the local communication and consultation procedures ‘work time listening 
and learning’, WTL. We were also given annual figures on the composition of each depot’s 
workforce, notably its gender, age and length of service mix. Additional information on the state of 
depots’ local labour markets, local unemployment rates and local median pay, has been added in 
using data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on employee earnings and local 
unemployment rates. The earnings data are for the year, and the unemployment data are monthly. 
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The ONS monthly index of national non-store retail sales, a large part of which relates to online 
sales, is used as a proxy measure for the level of demand for the sector’s delivery services 
(Appendix Table A1 includes the complete list of our variables of interest with their means and 
standard deviations). 
 Absence rates are based on the total hours of reported sickness absence in depots for the 
period divided by the total number of contracted hours adjusted for holiday entitlements (SICK). 
Replacement labour is provided in the form of monthly numbers of agency workers used by the 
depot (AGENCY). Productivity is measured in daily items delivered per full time equivalent 
employee (ITEMS). Unit costs comprise direct employment and operating costs (UC). Profitability 
is measured by operating net income which relates to revenue earned from the depot’s collection 
and delivery operations, minus direct and indirect costs (PROF).2 Quality of service relates to the 
percentage of items delivered on time (QS). The measures underlying these indicators are used as 
part of the organisation’s management accounting system and provide the basis for the performance 
targets set periodically for each depot. Targets are agreed between central and local management 
and revised to take account of changing local circumstances. They are used very much as a 
discipline for local managers who would be called to account if targets were missed, and whose 
bonuses contained an element related to their targets. They also have the distinct methodological 
advantage to factor out a number of influences on local performance that were recognised by central 
and local management but which could not be measured statistically. As we see later in detail, we 
use the gap between the actual values and their target values as our main performance measures. 
Where appropriate, all the indicators were normalised on a daily basis because of variation in the 
number of working days in calendar months. 
 The HYS survey of employees’ attitudes is our source of indicators of employee opinions 
about their jobs, their managers, their company, the consultation process and social facilities at 
work, and has a response rate of 60-70% during the period of observation. The survey is carried out 
annually on a rotating basis across depots during the year. For our purposes, it comprises about 50 
questions, most of which ask respondents to give their opinions on Likert scales. Our measures of 
employees’ opinions on these issues were made available to us in aggregated form at depot level, 
and we ran a factor analysis to condense the replies into five indexes relating to employees views 
about their job, their manager, the company, its social facilities, and the quality of the weekly work-
time listening and learning sessions. The “My job” index includes such questions as the quality of 
team relations, whether employees have the necessary skills, shared responsibility for safety and 
helping out and indicates how happy workers are about their jobs. The “My manager” index 
                                               
2
 Total revenue in this case excludes revenue paid centrally for certain major national contracts, and which is not 
attributed to individual depots. On the other hand, locally generated business is included in depot revenue. 
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includes such questions as fair treatment, influence on decisions, support from and approachability 
of management, management care about health and well-being and expresses workers' judgement 
about the quality of relations with their line managers and whether they feel they are supportive.  
The “My company” index includes such questions as communication of information about the 
company, organisational changes, and the bonus system, confidence in management’s leadership 
and its honesty; it reflects views about the perceived quality and trustworthiness of senor 
management. The “WTL” index measures the frequency of WTL sessions attended, improvements 
made as a result of issues raised in WTL and HYS, use of local budget to fix problems, and if well-
informed about depot performance. It provides a judgement about the experiences with 
management communication and consultation. Finally the “Social” index measures whether social 
facilities are good within the workplace. 
 For our analysis, we focus primarily on the financial years of 2005 and 2006. We have some 
data for 2004 and earlier, but were advised that its quality was not as good. As part of the 
company’s restructuring, it had sought to build a more effective statistical system with comparable 
data for each depot so that it could benchmark performance. It is also likely that the treatment of 
long-term and short-term absence changed during 2004.3 This causes a break in the series at the end 
of 2004-05, but should not greatly affect month-to-month variability on either side of this date. We 
therefore use the earlier data mainly as a check on the robustness of our estimations for 2005-06 and 
2006-07. We also limit the analysis to observations where the monthly sickness absence rate is 
below 25%. This leaves us with over 950 observations for about 45 depots in the two-year period. 
 
4. Descriptive statistics 
4.1 Did employees benefit from the absence and well-being policies? Trends in sickness 
absence in the company 2003-2008 and evolution of HYS scores over time 
Chart 1 shows the trend in sickness absence at PFW from the April 2003 up to March 2008 (pfw 
abs). The upper thick line traces the fall in absence rates, and shows that rates fell from around 6.5-
7% in 2003 and 2004, through 5% in 2005 and touching 4% in 2006. Thereafter they have 
fluctuated around 4-5% and appear to have levelled off at around 4.5% through 2007-08. It is 
interesting to note that a similar trend is registered for the usage of agency workers by PFW. This in 
fact decreases on average between 2004 and 2007 (Appendix Chart A1). Because sickness absence 
has a strong seasonal element, and can be affected by national sickness and economic factors, we 
                                               
3
 Before then, most depots had counted only paid periods of sick absence. Employees on long-term sick leave 
for six to twelve months would have been on half pay, the rest coming from the sick pay fund, and so would have 
counted as half an absence. Those absent for twelve months or more would have been paid entirely from the sick pay 
fund, and have disappeared from the absence figures. 
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show also monthly figures for sickness absence from the Labour Force Survey (lfs abs wt). The 
concepts are not directly comparable in a way that affects levels but not trends, (see the note 
beneath Chart 1). We also regressed the organisation’s absence rate on the national figure using 
year and month dummies to capture time and seasonal effects. The predicted absence figure 
(pfwabs_pred) and the residuals (pfwabs_res) are also shown. The coefficients on the year dummies 
show an improvement by 2007 of about two and half points on the 2003 figure. 
   As mentioned earlier, the period of our study saw a major effort by the company to improve 
its absence management in order to reduce its high absence rates. Chart 2 shows the same PFW 
absence rates, but with the timing of major attendance and well-being policies superimposed. The 
thick red lines show the start of major policy initiatives such as the launch of the ‘Absence to 
Attendance’ programme in autumn 2004, which focused on reinvigorating the one-to-one return-to-
work interviews across the whole organisation and revitalising sickness reporting. The thin black 
lines represent the start of other, important but less far-reaching, policies. As can be seen, the major 
policy initiatives appear at times of significantly higher levels of absence, and are followed by a 
noticeable decline, suggesting an initial impact as they are rolled out, but also the need to keep up 
the pressure on attendance once they are in place. The smaller-scale policies appear fairly regularly 
over time, but there is a notable cluster of measures between the autumn of 2006 and early 2007 as 
absence levels appeared to rise again, before settling down again in 2007-08.  
 Although it would be analytically tidy to draw a sharp distinction between policies aimed at 
employee health and well-being and those aimed at improved attendance management, in practice, 
the depot managers we interviewed saw them as complements to each other. They stressed that 
work-related issues, such as harassment, difficult work schedules, and conflict with domestic 
pressures, which may both contribute to poor health and attendance, could often be addressed by 
relatively small adjustments by either party. To take the appropriate actions, local management 
needs the knowledge, and this is best obtained, in their view, through the return-to-work interviews 
and job level consultation and communication. The company’s health and well-being programmes 
provided resources local management could draw upon to address issues raised in the return-to-
work interviews. Thus, the same channels that might be associated with closer absence monitoring, 
are also essential to the kind of direct contact with individual employees to tackle underlying causes 
of absence. 
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Table 1 presents aggregate figures drawn from the key questions contained in the HYS 
questionnaire which relate to employees' well being within the workplace in the three years for 
which we have complete surveys. Given the good response rates, 60-70%, one can treat the results 
as fairly representative. Although the data available to us relate only to responses aggregated by 
depot, it is possible to assess how far overall attitudes to the company and its management are 
positive or negative. The overall results show that 68-75% of employees felt positively about their 
jobs, and broadly similar percentages were proud to work for the company, and wanted to continue 
working for it. Likewise, views were similarly positive about feeling fairly treated and enjoying 
work with their team. The one weak response in the table related to feeling valued by the company, 
which is comparatively lower than the others.  
 The operations managers interviewed stressed the importance of the blend of stick and carrot 
in the organisation’s absence and well-being policies. It is hard to judge precisely which is the more 
important, and therefore how far improved attendance was due to improved absence monitoring and 
how far it was due to employee well-being including improved dialogue, mutual support and 
understanding within the workplace. If employees felt management was relying on the ‘big stick’, 
increased monitoring and discipline, then it is likely that attitudes would be negative. If on the other 
hand, they felt that management was approaching the question fairly, and adopting a supportive 
attitude, as described by some of the depot managers interviewed, then one would expect attitudes 
to be more positive. It is interesting to note in Table 1 that the share of affirmative answers to the 
key questions increases over time of percentages that range between 6 and 10 points. This 
observation suggests that employees well-being increased over time within the workplace and gives 
some ground to the latter interpretation i.e. the view that organisation's policies have worked more 
by improving employees' well-being rather than increasing monitoring within the workplace.4 
 
  4.2 Depot sickness absence and performance variables 
Our analysis of sickness absence uses variations in absence rates between depots over time. Several 
studies of sickness absence observed that absence rates appeared to vary significantly between 
workplaces. A notable feature of the reduction in absence rates at PFW has been the improvement 
among the ‘worst performers’, as shown in Chart 3, which plots depot absence rates over time by 
            
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
4
  Because the results also feed into local managers’ performance criteria, one could imagine that discontented 
employees would be motivated to respond rather than be apathetic, although we have no direct evidence on this. 
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deciles (similar trends are experienced by workplace performance indicators; see Appendix 
Chart A2). 
       Another notable feature is that when depots experience high rates of sickness absence, they often 
last for several months. In other words, depot absence rates often do not reflect the random impact 
of short-term epidemics, but rather, something more systemic in the workplace environment. The 
same is true of the other performance variables we use in this study. Chart 4 shows the month-on-
month correlations between depot sickness rates, and although these decline over time, it is clear 
that if a depot has a high rate in month 1, the trace of this does not disappear until four or five 
months later. Other performance variables show a similar slow rate of convergence towards the 
mean. Of these, the ability to deliver on time (quality of service), and profitability seem to show the 
most stable rank orders between depots.  An analysis of the correlation coefficients between our 
variables of interest reveals a negative correlation of sick absence with productivity (-0,08), quality 
of service (-0,16) and profitability (-0,08) and a positive correlation of sick absence with unit costs 
(0,05; the full correlation matrix is in Appendix Table A2). 
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Empirical strategy 
In line with our motivation, our empirical strategy is two fold. We first analyse the effect of absence 
management and well being policies on sick absence; after that, we investigate the role of absence 
as a determinant of organisational performance. 
We start by estimating the following model: 
 
SICKjmy=βjy Xjy +Z’γ + αj + δm+ δy +uimy;     (1) 
 
Here Xjy are the indicators for employee well being within the firm j in year y, Z is a vector of 
controls for labour and product market outcomes (local unemployment rate, median income, index 
of non store sales in the depot's district). αj, are depot dummies while δm and δy are time dummies 
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(for month and year, respectively). We run equation (1) by simple OLS.5 
 The next step of our analysis is to explore the effects of sickness absence on organisational 
performance. We estimate the following model using OLS: 
 
Yjmy=ηjmy SICKjmy +X’φ +Z’λ+ αj + δm+ δy +vimy,     (2) 
 
where Yjmy is our indicator of performance (i.e. Y= ITEMS, UC, QS, PROF) in depot j, year y and 
month m. We start by estimating equation (2) using as a dependent variable the actual values of Y. 
These estimates however are likely to be biased due to the fact that observed value of each 
performance indicator also depends on the target values of the variable itself which are set by the 
management on the basis of the characteristics of the depot and the time period. Because of the way 
these targets are set, they take account of a number of important factors not measured in our data. 
To control for this we also estimate equation (2) using as dependent variables our performance 
indicators in their deviation from target values.6 
 Finally, we refine the model by integrating the use of replacement labour. In a market that is 
increasingly dominated by timed-delivery, an organisation needs agency workers to meet its 
obligations if it is short-staffed owing to sickness absence. One could expect the use of replacement 
labour to be both less effective and more costly than regular employees.7 On the other hand, agency 
staff do not have to be employed when there is no work for them. 
 To take account of the intervening effect of agency use between sickness absence and 
performance outcomes, we estimate the following system: 
 
Yjmy=ρjmy AGENCYjmy +X’ρ +Z’φ + αj + δm+ δy +νimy;    (3) 
AGENCYjmy=χjmy SICKjmy +X’ψ+Z’κ + αj + δm+ δy +ζimy;    (4) 
 
                                               
5 In Appendix 2 we investigate further the relation between workers well-being and absenteeism by describing 
the possible determinants of well being within the workplace which emerged by the interviews with the operations 
managers and hypothesizing some transmission mechanism to absence. 
6
   These targets are set and regularly adjusted in consultation between the central management of PFW and the 
local depots' management. They are intended to take account of factors affecting performance that are outside local 
management control, such as location and the age of premises. Some of these depot specific factors could change over 
time, and so not be reflected in the fixed effects (e.g. major new investment or major changes in the state of local 
roads). Targets are also an important dimension of business performance in their own right as they play a key role in 
business coordination. Hence, this analysis would also capture the disruptive effect of variations in absence on 
performance.  
7
  This idea seems to be confirmed by the interviews we had with depot managers. Their general complaint was 
that agency staff were less effective than their regular employees as they often lacked detailed knowledge of delivery 
routes, acquaintance with customers’ staff which could be especially important for collections. Managers seem to 
consider  their regular drivers as the ‘eyes and the ears’ of his business, and important for building good relationships 
with customers. They would seldom use an agency driver for an important customer. Moreover notice that the use of 
agency staff was charged to depots at a rate about a fifth higher than the cost of pay and benefits for their regular 
employees. 
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Where AGENCYjmy is the number of agency workers employed by depot j in year y and month m. 
As before, Yjmy is our indicator of performance. The system composed by (4) and (5) aims at 
investigating the existence of an indirect channel through which absence may affect organisational 
performance. We estimate it by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) thus allowing standard 
errors being correlated across specifications.8 
 
5.2 Results 
 
Table 2 shows the OLS estimates of the relationship between sickness absence and five measures 
(factors) of employee views related to their well-being at work: their manager, their company, their 
jobs, workplace consultation, and workplace social facilities. In columns [1] to [5] we include each 
indicator of well being separately while in column [6] we introduce all the indicators in the same 
regression. All regressions also include a number of other variables relating to the state of the 
labour market (local unemployment and local median pay) and product demand (non-store sales) at 
the district level, and a selection of workforce characteristics likely to capture the effects of 
domestic pressures, and the employee’s integration into the workforce.  
 Employee perceptions of supportiveness of their managers, their company, and of workplace 
social facilities exert a weak or non-significant influence on depot absence rates (Table 2, columns 
[1], [2] and [5]). Good team-level consultation and communication with line managers is associated 
with lower absence levels (column [4]). It was suggested earlier that this is likely to be correlated 
with effective attendance management in depots (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed analysis of the 
relation between sickness absence and WTL based on a model derived from our interviews with the 
managers). Conversely, a favourable judgement about their jobs is positively related to absenteeism 
(column [3]). Although surprising at a first sight, this result may reflect how accommodating, and 
possibly indulgent, their managers are with regard to attendance.   
 Finally, all the estimates show that a higher local unemployment rate is associated with 
lower depot absence rates. This can to be interpreted as reduced local employment opportunities 
causing employees to value their current jobs more highly and so provide better attendance and 
higher effort. Conversely a higher local median pay improves the outside options for workers, thus 
being associated to higher absence. Non-store sales indicate the level of product demand in the 
sector, which puts pressure on workloads thus contributing to fatigue and absenteeism9. Size and 
                                               
8
  On the basis of the interviews we had with line managers within PFW, in Appendix 3 we develop a model 
which describes how the increased reliance on agency workers implied by sickness absence  reduces productivity and 
quality of service and, accordingly, firms efficiency and profitability. 
9
  Several of the managers we interviewed recognised that the work was physically demanding, and people got 
tired and were likely to fall sick after periods of prolonged overtime working. 
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significance of the coefficients is not altered when we add all the indicators in the same regression 
(column [6]). 
         In Table 3, we report the results from the estimates of equation (2) on the actual level of ITEMS, 
UC, QS and PROF.  SICK shows a negative impact on ITEMS and QS which is significant at the 
5% level (Table 3, columns [1] and [3]). The coefficients for the impact of SICK on UC and PROF 
also take the expected signs but are not significant (columns [2] and [4]. Notice also that employees' 
well being does not seem to exert any significant positive impact on workplace performance once 
we account directly for the impact of sick absence. 
         As explained before, however, estimates reported in Table 3 may be biased as  the target values set 
by the management for each indicator change across depots and over time. To correct this bias, we 
estimate equation (2) on our performance indicators taken as variances of the actual values from 
their target. Table 4 reports the results. Compared to the estimates on actual values, the impact of 
absence on performance indicators is now more significant (always between 1% and 5%): a one 
percentage point rise in a depot’s sickness absence is associated with an additional shortfall on the 
productivity target of -0.15 items delivered per person per day, and it pushes unit costs an additional 
£0.01 over cost targets per item delivered. It moreover reduces of the 0,7% the percentage of items 
delivered on time and of around £2 per day the net income produced on average by each depot.  
        We suggested before that sick absence may also indirectly affect organisational performance via the 
implied use of replacement labour. Table 5 presents the results of four sets of estimates from the 
system composed by equations (3) and (4) above on ITEMS, UC, QS, and PROF. We estimate each 
set by “Seemingly Unrelated Regressions” to allow the standard errors to be correlated across the 
two equations in the system. These estimates give some support to our theoretical priors: variations 
in sickness absence have a direct impact on the use of replacement labour, a one point rise in 
sickness absence leading to an increase of 1.3 agency workers which is significant at the 1% on all 
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our indicators of performance.10 The increased agency use has the anticipated effect on 
performance: raising unit costs, and reducing productivity, quality of service and profitability. 
Coefficients are again significant at the 1%.11 
         Before concluding, we provide a simple visual presentation of our empirical findings showing the 
channels through which management policies aimed at increasing workers' well being and reducing 
absence may lead to improved workplace performance. While it is clearly beyond the scope of the 
present paper to provide a comprehensive analysis of such mechanisms, in Chart 5 we use a simple 
path analysis12 to sketch out a possible model for the impact of improved absence management and 
communication on business performance. This is based largely on our interviews with operations 
managers of PFW, but it also reflects a number of the points emerging from the regression analysis 
in this paper.. Path coefficients scale each variable in terms of its standard deviation. This is 
analogous to seeing whether the best performing depots in terms of WTL will have the lowest 
absence rates and the best quality of service. The chart expresses visually the same relationships 
noted earlier, for example, that absence rates have a rather weak direct effect on business 
performance outcomes, and that their main effect is through use of replacement agency labour. 
 
  
6. Conclusions 
This paper has explored the potential gains for one organisation that derive from reducing 
absenteeism by improved absence management supported by employee health and well-being 
policies. We used a new data set which includes monthly observations on sickness absence, 
workplace performance and yearly information on workforce composition and well-being for a 
company which operates in the logistics sector, for the period 2004-2008. Due to the level of detail 
of the data, we are able to look at four complementary dimensions of workplace performance i.e. its 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
10
 For an average-sized depot, a 1% point increase in the absence rate equates to an increase in 0.6 people absent, 
implying a replacement ratio of about two agency staff for one absent regular staff (1.3/0.6). Notice that this figure  
corresponds exactly to what the depot managers told us about the relative productivity of regular workers. 
11
 In annual terms, across the organisation’s 48 depots, on these estimates, a one point increase in sickness 
absence would translate roughly into a drop in productivity of 22k items delivered, increased costs of £207k, and a 
reduction of net income of about £300k. 
12
  Path analysis expresses the relationships between the variables as standardised ‘path coefficients’ so one may 
compare the relationships between the different variables. Full details are provided in Appendix 2 
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productivity, efficiency, the quality of the service provided and profitability. Our results show that 
good consultation and communication is associated with lower absence and higher efficiency, 
productivity, quality of the service provided and profitability of the firm. We also suggested that an 
indirect channel exists which links workers’ absence to firms’ profitability through the increased 
use of replacement labour and the reduction of the quality of service provided. 
 The interpretation we want to give of our results is that the improved recording of absence 
and systematic one-to-one interviews and follow up of work absences has improved management’s 
‘procedural grip’ (to use the words of one central manager), on the problem. However, in the view 
of the PFW depot managers interviewed, this management of absence was facilitated by the give-
and-take facilitated by the well-being policies that supported it. We believe that the present analysis, 
due to the excellent data provided to us by the organisation, and the time that managers gave for the 
in-depth interviews, provides the basis for a significant step forward in the analysis of the effects of 
absence and absence policies on organisational performance. It has made it possible to adopt a 
behavioural rather than an accounting approach to estimating the adverse costs of sickness absence, 
and this is a significant advance on studies using national labour force and production data. The 
availability of the performance targets which are used by central and local management has made it 
possible to open up an new area for analysis: the effects of the inherent variability in absence on the 
coordination of activity within a complex business. It has been possible to examine, albeit 
indirectly, the impact of local management quality and local implementation of the policies, and the 
availability of employee attitude information has made it possible to distinguish the ‘fear’ from the 
‘give-and-take’ approach. 
 Inevitably many questions remain. PFW is not a ‘representative firm’ and this affects how 
far one may generalise to other organisations. The importance of just-in-time delivery, although 
spreading across organisations, is not yet the general rule, and it may never be. The workforce is 
predominantly male at a time when women make up nearly half of the national workforce. On the 
other hand, the workforce in PFW is skilled but not highly educated, and so is rather like that in 
many other UK organisations. Moreover, their basic earnings are close to those of other drivers 
reported in the ONS annual statistics on hours and earnings. As the CIPD (2008) observed, when 
presenting its annual absence survey, such policies as those use by PFW are not rocket science, but 
a blend of systematic use of absence procedures, improved communication between staff and 
management, and supported by employee well-being policies. The same CIPD survey showed that a 
great many UK organisations do not have a systematic approach to employee attendance, so the 
potential to benefit from the PFW experience appears considerable.  
 The main limitation of the present analysis is the lack of monthly observations for the 
indicators of well-being (available only on yearly basis) and of individual information on workers' 
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characteristics within the firm. It would be very interesting to collect such information (of course 
subject to availability) and investigate more in detail the individual determinants of absenteeism 
within the workplace and how these affect organisational performance. 
 
7. Main Text Tables 
Table 1. Employee judgements about their organisation 2004-2007. 
 
Q 
no Question 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
    % % % 
2 I enjoy my job 68 75 75 
57 I am proud to work for my company 59 70 70 
49 
I would like to be working for my company in 12 months 
time 71 80 80 
56 I feel my company values me 36 43 43 
14 My line manager treats me fairly and with respect 65 72 73 
29 I enjoy working with my team 63 69 69 
 Unweighted average scores across depots.    
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Table 2. OLS estimates of the relationship between sickness absence and measures of employee evaluations of their  
workplace, workforce characteristics and market pressures.   
 
Dependent variable – SICK 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
             
Good manager -0.052          0.063  
 [0,166]          [0,175]  
Good Company   -0.31        -0.321  
   [0,202]        [0,248]  
Good job     0.414 ****     0.441 **** 
     [0,135]      [0,143]  
Good WTL       -0.493 ****   -0.390 ** 
       [0,182]    [0,194]  
Good Social facilities         -0.179  0.049  
         [0,161]  [0,188]  
Non-store sales 0.041 * 0.041 * 0.043 * 0.039  0.041 * 0.041 * 
 [0,024]  [0,024]  [0,024]  [0,024]  [0,024]  [0,024]  
Local unemployment % -0.872 **** -0.76 **** -1.094 **** -0.771 **** -0.928 **** -0.890 **** 
 [0,195]  [0,205]  [0,197]  [0,191]  [0,190]  [0,226]  
Median local pay  0.572  0.548  0.823 * 0.306  0.62  0.592  
 [0,484]  [0,483]  [0,488]  [0,491]  [0,485]  [0,501]  
Controls for workforce composition1 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Depot dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year, month dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 (adj) 0.4017 0.4032 0.4078 0.4065 0.4025 0.45 
N 967 967 967 967 967 967 
 
Robust standard errors in squared brackets: **** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%. 
1 include % of women, prime age workers, part time workers,workers with  tenure less than 5 years. 
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Table 3. Impact of sickness absence on depot performance  
(OLS estimates on actual values of performance indicators: 2005/06 and 2006/07). 
 
 
        
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Dep variable ITEMS UC QS PROF 
         
SICK -0.11 ** 0.009  -0.068 ** -0.601  
 [0,048]  [0,007]  [0,033]  [0,750]  
Good manager -0.321  0.043 *** -0.217  -1.035  
 [0,222]  [0,017]  [0,186]  [4,158]  
Good company -0.001  -0.043  0.381  -1.071  
 [0,432]  [0,053]  [0,245]  [7,380]  
Good job 0.149  -0.012  0.015  1.323  
 [0,152]  [0,014]  [0,139]  [3,991]  
Good WTL -0.134  0.057  -0.106  8.616  
 [0,365]  [0,051]  [0,201]  [6,590]  
Good social facilities 0.251  0  -0.404 ** -23.58 **** 
 [0,230]  [0,021]  [0,181]  [6,950]  
UK non-store sales 0.624 **** -0.01  -0.204 **** 1.755 **** 
 [0,040]  [0,007]  [0,018]  [0,636]  
Median pay -0.868 * -0.001  -0.806 * 6.228  
 [0,491]  [0,089]  [0,406]  [11,917]  
Urate -0.39  0.016  0.37  0.596  
 [0,255]  [0,030]  [0,226]  [5,327]  
Controls for workforce composition1 Y Y Y Y 
Depot dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year, month dummies Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.8612 0.6691 0.9014 0.862 
N 952 960 949 955 
 
Clustered standard errors at the depot level in squared brackets 
**** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%. 
1 include % of women, age and tenure composition, part time workers, temporary workers. 
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Table 4. Impact of sickness absence on depot performance  
(OLS estimates on gaps between actual and target outcomes: 2005/06 and 2006/07). 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Dep variable ITEMS UC QS PROF 
         
SICK -0.152 *** 0.01 ** -0.075 ** -1.658 **** 
 [0,061]  [0,005]  [0,036]  [0,548]  
Good manager -0.879  0.05  -0.25  -24.709 **** 
 [0,703]  [0,032]  [0,206]  [4,261]  
Good company 0.277  -0.01  0.212  -2.134  
 [1,115]  [0,050]  [0,254]  [6,557]  
Good job 0.563  0.01  -0.123  8.241 ** 
 [0,758]  [0,028]  [0,159]  [3,698]  
Good WTL 0.319  -0.03  0.262  3.495  
 [0,838]  [0,043]  [0,235]  [4,926]  
Good social facilities -0.699  0.05  -0.635 **** 2.241  
 [0,548]  [0,035]  [0,218]  [5,628]  
Median pay 0.464  -0.02  1.697 ** 28.448 * 
 [2,213]  [0,143]  [0,759]  [15,516]  
Urate 0.747  -0.1 ** 0.562 ** 3.781  
 [0,818]  [0,046]  [0,245]  [8,630]  
Controls for workforce composition1 Y Y Y Y 
Depot dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year, month dummies Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.5361 0.4514 0.8933 0.3343 
N 952 960 909 955 
Clustered standard errors at the depot level in squared brackets 
**** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%. 
1 include % of women, age and tenure composition, part time workers, temporary workers. 
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Table 5. Sick absence, agency replacement labour and organisational performance (SURE estimates, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007). 
 
  
[1] 
  
[2] 
  
[3] 
  
[4] 
Dep var: AGENCY ITEMS   AGENCY UC   AGENCY QS   AGENCY PROF 
                    
AGENCY   -0 ****    0.005 ****    -0.042 ****    -0.347 **** 
   [0,006]     [0,001]     [0,004]     [0,089]  
Sick absence rate (%) 1.28 ****    1.333 ****    1.317 ****    1.326 ****   
 [0,221]     [0,221]     [0,224]     [0,222]    
‘My manager’  good -2.29 *    -2.1     -2.19     -2.116    
 
[1,303]     [1,308]     [1,356]     [1,309]    
‘My company’  good 2.89     2.269     2.269     2.614    
 
[1,805]     [1,805]     [1,829]     [1,816]    
‘My job’  good 0.18     0.397     0.559     0.3    
 
[1,033]     [1,037]     [1,056]     [1,038]    
‘WTL’  good 1.47     1.557     1.267     1.55    
 
[1,394]     [1,397]     [1,460]     [1,401]    
‘Social facilities’ good -1.1     -1.086     -1.06     -1.285    
 
[1,488]     [1,495]     [1,535]     [1,495]    
UK non-store sales   0.64 ****    -0.017 ****    -0.14 ****    2.233 **** 
   [0,030]     [0,003]     [0,02]     [0,449]  
Local labour market conditions1 Y N   Y N   Y N   Y N 
Controls for workforce  
composition2 Y N  Y N  Y N  Y N 
Depot dummies Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Year, month dummies Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
R2 0.859 0.581  0.578 0.68  0.577 0.905  0.576 0.852 
N 942 942   949 949   937 937   945 945 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets: **** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%. 
1 local unemployment rate and local median pay 
2 include % of women, age and tenure composition, part time workers, temporary workers. 
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Main Text Charts  
 
Chart 1. Sickness absence by monthly reporting period 2003-2008. 
The vertical bars show April of each year. 
 
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
ap
-
03 jun aug oc
t
de
c feb
ap
-
04 jun aug oc
t
de
c feb
ap
-
05 jun aug oc
t
de
c feb
ap
-
06 jun aug oc
t
de
c feb
ap
-
07 jun aug oc
t
de
c feb
pfw abs lfsabsw t pfw abs_pred pfw abs_res
 
 
Note: The thick upper line shows the rate (%) of sickness absence at PFW based on hours of absence divided by 
total contracted hours, adjusted for annual leave entitlements. The lower thick purple line shows days’ absence in 
the past week for all employees from the national Labour Force Survey, based on self-reports by respondents. 
The difference of concept means that the levels are not comparable. The upper thin dashed line shows the rates 
of PFW absence predicted from a regression analysis including time and depot dummies and the national 
absence figure. This removes the effect of any national level absence factors from the PFW figure. The lower 
thin line plots the regression residuals. The years shown are fiscal years from April to March. Sources: PFW and 
the British Labour Force Survey. 
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Chart 2. Incidence of major well-being and absence policies plotted on absence rates 2003-2007 
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Chart 3. Monthly sick absence rate (%) figures by depot 
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Note: absence rates (%) by depot. Rates of greater than 25% were excluded on the grounds of likely recording errors. 
With data for about 45 depots, the bottom 10% represent 4 depots. 
 
 
Chart 4. The persistence of absence rates and other KPI scores over time 
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Chart 5: the relationship between improved absence management and WTL and improved 
profitability and unit costs (beta coefficients) 
(Unit cost coefficients shown in parentheses) 
 
 
 
All beta coefficients are significant at the 1% level, except agency use on productivity, significant at 
the 2% level. Depot, year and month dummies used throughout.  
Absence 
rates 
Quality of 
Service 
Profitability 
 
(Unit costs) 
Productivity 
Improved 
absence mgt & 
WTL 
Agency use 
+0.06 
-0.23 +0.16 -0.05 +0.14 (UC: -0.33) 
-0.19 +0.13 (UC: -0.13) 
 27 
 
8. Appendix Charts and Tables 
 
Table A1: Means and standard deviations of main variables (2005/06-2006/07): company’s items 
relate to monthly figures by depot. 
 
Variable description Units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
ITEMS Items delivered per 
fte per day 954 40.27 7.13 18.97 70.38 
UC Operational costs 
per item delivered 962 3.13 0.55 -3.49 5.96 
QS % of items delivered 
on time 951 94.72 5.38 63.10 99.28 
PROF Net income per head 
per day 957 -19.14 103.45 -435.37 325.33 
SICK % 996 4.75 2.94 0.00 24.09 
AGENCY Headcount 955 23.15 22.04 0.00 154.70 
       
Local 
unemployment 
% 
972 5.49 2.01 2.50 10.30 
Local median hourly 
pay 
£ 
972 9.53 1.29 7.71 13.69 
Index of non-store 
sales 
Base 100 
996 100.12 11.75 84.10 131.80 
       
Good manager Factor score 996 -0.05 1.02 -3.26 1.92 
Good company Factor score 996 0.34 0.83 -1.88 2.09 
Good job Factor score 996 0.19 0.93 -5.47 1.83 
Good WTL Factor score 996 -0.25 0.95 -2.62 1.82 
Good social 
facilities 
Factor score 
996 -0.05 0.93 -2.24 3.51 
       
Female (%)  967 9.94 4.09 2.22 24.56 
Part-time (%) % 991 8.51 4.26 0.00 19.68 
Permanent (%) % 967 92.34 5.62 71.65 100.00 
       
% Aged 35-39 % 967 17.10 6.10 0.00 35.71 
% Aged 40-44 % 967 18.56 6.40 3.92 42.86 
% Aged 45-49 % 967 13.45 5.29 2.38 25.00 
% Aged 50-54 % 967 9.68 4.09 2.00 20.41 
% Aged 55-59 % 967 8.08 4.23 1.35 17.65 
% Aged 60-64 % 967 3.55 2.65 0.00 13.43 
% Aged >=65 % 967 0.44 1.02 0.00 4.76 
       
Length of service 0-
4 years (%) 
% 
967 26.68 12.69 3.80 56.78 
Notes: factor scores based on three years’ data, 2004-2007. 
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Table A2: sickness absence and workplace performance: correlation matrix 
 
 
     
 ITEMS QS SICK PROF UC 
ITEMS 1     
QS 0.07 1    
SICK -0.08 -0.17 1   
PROF 0.45 0.49 -0.08 1  
UC -0.64 -0.07 0.05 -0.34 1 
      
All correlations are significant at the 1% level   
 
 
 
 
Table A3: WTL evaluation and sickness absence: SURE estimates 
 
      
  Good WTL SICK  
Good WTL   -0.94 ****  
   [0,169]   
Non-store sales   0.038 *  
 
  [0,024]   
Median local pay   0.402   
 
  [0,464]   
% female -0.21 **** -0.117   
 [0,019]  [0,009]   
% permanent 3.753 **    
 [0,962]     
% age 35-44 0.05 ****    
 [0,01]     
Urate 0.166 ****    
 
[0,035]     
Depot dummies Y Y  
Year, month dummies Y Y  
Observations 967 967  
R2 (adj) 0.808 0.432  
Robust standard errors in brackets: **** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%;  
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Table A4. Path analysis coefficients, standard errors and diagnostics 
 
  Coef. Std. Err. Beta 
Signif- 
icance  
Sick absence rate (%)          
‘WTL’  good -624 0.16 -229 ****  
Local unemployment % -755 0.188 -577 ****  
R2 0.318        
Agency use          
Sick absence rate (%) 1.351 0.219 0.161 ****  
UK non-store sales 1.381 0.16 0.736 ****  
R2 0.579        
Quality of service          
‘WTL’  good 0.339 0.124 0.06 ****  
Agency use -46 0.004 -186 ****  
R2 0.901        
Productivity          
Agency use -15 0.006 -47 ***  
UK non-store sales 0.647 0.031 1.063 ****  
R2 0.86        
Profitability          
Quality of service 2.437 0.766 0.127 ****  
Productivity 2.09 0.5 0.143 ****  
UK non-store sales 0.922 0.561 0.104 *  
R2 0.855        
n 930        
          
 
Unit labour costs          
Quality of service -12 0.004 -128 ****  
Productivity -23 0.003 -330 ****  
UK non-store sales 0.009 0.003 0.21 ****  
R2 0.811        
n 930        
 
Depot, year and month dummies used throughout; robust standard errors 
**** <1%, *** <2%, ** <5%, * <10% 
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Chart A1. Monthly average rates of sick absence and of agency use (measured on different scales) 
in 2005/06 and 2006/07. 
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Notes: Sick absence (%, upper line) mean multiplied by 5 to compare with agency usage (no of ftes, 
lower line). 
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Chart A2. Means and percentiles of depot key performance indicators over time. 
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Appendix Graph 2 shows the dispersion of the depot key performance indicators over time. Reading 
the panels left to right, the upper panels show productivity (items delivered per full-time equivalent) 
and sickness absence (%), and the lower panels show quality of service and unit costs. The 
percentiles shown are p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90, and the mean. 
 
It is notable that quality of service varies seasonally with the number of items delivered per full-
time employee. Note also that the peaks in agency use follow the same seasonal pattern as parcels 
delivered and quality of service. This supports the view that the primary function of agency use is 
as a buffer to cope with varying customer demand, and that adaptation to absence uses the same 
buffer mechanism.  
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9. Appendix 1: Use of HYS attitude data to assess implementation of policies at 
depot level  
 
Although the well-being and absence policies shown in Chart 2 were company-wide in their 
application, our interviews with both central and local management made it clear that there was also 
a good deal of variation at depot level in terms of how quickly and how effectively they were 
implemented. Our strategy has been to use this variation in order to gauge the effects of local 
management implementation. Of the questions asked in the employee surveys, those on the 
operation of WTL best capture the quality of depot level implementation of the well-being and 
attendance policies. The questions asked for more factual information than many of the other survey 
questions relevant to this study, and provide a ‘view from below’ about the conduct of aspects of 
depot management. 
 The depot level information on WTL from these surveys, relates to employees’ participation 
in, and satisfaction with, the weekly team-level consultation and communication meetings, and 
whether management followed up and implemented issues that were raised there. In these meetings, 
typically, managers would have 10 minutes to raise their issues, and the team members, 10 minutes 
for theirs, with a further 10 minutes for joint matters. Participation by employees involves a cost on 
their part because they still have to get their jobs done, and in our interviews, depot managers told 
us that most common reason for not attending was that that their drivers just wanted to get out onto 
the road. Hence, their willingness to participate reflects their perception of WTL effectiveness, and 
their interest in discussing work-related issues with management. 
 How far can we judge that effective WTL is a good proxy for effective implementation of 
the absence and well-being policies? From our interviews with local managers, good WTL and 
good attendance management go hand in hand, and have a shared objective of improving workplace 
performance, and building on employee support. Both involve local management in committing 
some resources, in the first instance at team level, and in the second, at individual level. Both 
involve management seeking to improve employees’ understanding of the company’s needs, and 
understanding how their individual performance and attendance contributes to the overall picture. 
Indeed, there are good methodological reasons for its use. First, WTL covers most employees, 
including those who might potentially take absence but choose not to, whereas return-to-work 
interviews affect only those who have been absent. Second, the numbers going through the 
interviews in some months, especially in smaller depots, could be too small for a reliable statistical 
analysis. 
 Thus our key assumption is that depots with good communication for WTL will also have 
good communication for the return-to-work interviews, and those that are good at finding resources 
to meet employee issues in WTL will also be good at developing solutions to improve attendance. It 
might be objected that we are not measuring the incidence of absence and well-being policies so 
much as variations in the quality of local management. This cannot be excluded. However, 
improving attendance was one of the top priorities given to local management on the ground that it 
held the key to solving a number of the organisation’s performance problems. 
 In Table A3, we show the results of our SURE regressions of measures of local management 
on sickness absence. They comprise two elements: the first equation concerns the determinants of 
‘good WTL’, and the second, the influence of ‘good WTL’ on sickness absence. The variables 
included in the different steps merit some explanation. Concerning the determinants of good WTL, 
regular participation depends partly on management quality, and partly on employee interest. 
Willman et al (2006) argue that employees with a greater stake in their jobs will be more likely to 
want to voice their concerns to management, and see the business prosper. That stake is proxied by 
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taking the percentage of employees in the depot aged 35-44, the percentage who are permanent 
employees, and the local rate of unemployment. At age 35-44, drivers would be experienced and 
have developed a good knowledge of their routes and customers, something fostered by greater 
stability in the workforce, and high local unemployment would signal a paucity of competing jobs 
where they could use their skills. This ‘asset specificity’, according to Willman et al (2006), would 
lead to a greater demand for involvement of the kind occurring within the weekly WTL sessions. 
Concerning the influences on sickness absence alongside WTL, non-store sales capture the pressure 
of work, local median pay, outside job opportunities, and the percentage of women, the degree of 
household pressures on work attendance. We also confirmed the robustness of these years’ data by 
extending the analysis to 2004/05. As can be seen in Table A3, good WTL is associated with lower 
rates of absence, and the effects are quite strong. Factor scores are measures in standard deviation 
units, with about 2/3 of all cases lying within one standard deviation unit of the mean, which in this 
case is zero. Thus, one could read the coefficients as follows: if a depot moves from the average 
score on WTL effectiveness to the score within the top 15% of depots, its absence rate would fall by 
nearly one point (-0.944).  
 
 
 
10. Appendix 2: Path analysis of the impact of absence policies on net income 
and unit costs 
 Table A4 reports the detailed results of a “path analysis” shown in which suggests what the 
relative strengths of the different linkages may be in terms of standardised units based on their 
respective standard deviations. All coefficients are statistically significant: in particular, the 
coefficient of 1.3 for the impact of sickness on agency use in Table 5 becomes 0.16 in terms of the 
two variables’ relative standard deviations. The path analysis suggests that the impact of agency use 
may be more damaging to quality of service than to productivity (unit costs).13  The impact of 
improved productivity is to raise profitability (+0.14), but by about half the amount that it reduces 
unit costs (-0.33). The impact through quality of service on profitability is almost equivalent to the 
one on unit costs (+0.13 vs -0.13) i.e. improved quality of service seems to be as effective at 
increasing firms profitability as at increasing its efficiency. 
 Finally, notice that the main purpose of the path analysis has been to provide an illustration 
of the statistical relationships behind the organisational model which emerged from the interviews 
with the line managers. Of course this does not preclude the influence of other mechanisms than 
that described and which could cause absenteeism to lowers firms’ profitability and efficiency. 
 
 
 
                                               
13
 This may reflect difficulties in redistributing work when agency staff are used because of their lesser 
familiarity with the job, and the growing importance of timed deliveries. Thus although it may be possible to maintain 
the volume of collections and deliveries, and thus physical productivity, when agency staff are used, it is much harder to 
meet the customer deadlines which lie at the heart of service quality. 
 34 
 
11. References 
Allen, Steven (1983) How much does absenteeism cost? Journal of Human Resources, 18: 3, 
Summer, pp. 379-393. 
Allen, Steven G. (1981) An Empirical Model of Work Attendance. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 63: 1, Feb., pp. 77-87. 
Barmby, T. A., Orme C. D., and Treble, John G. (1991) Worker Absenteeism: An Analysis Using 
Microdata. The Economic Journal, 101: 405, Mar., pp. 214-229. 
Barmby, Tim, and Sibly, Suzyrman (2004) Analysing absence behaviour using event history 
models Managerial and Decision Economics, 25: 3, pp. 141 - 145. 
Black, Dame Carol (2008) Working for a healthier tomorrow: Dame Carol Black's review of the 
health of Britain's working age population. Presented to the Secretary of State for Health and 
the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 17th March 2008, TSO (the Stationery Office), 
London. 
Bradley, Steve, Green, Colin, and Leeves, Gareth (2007) Worker absence and shirking: Evidence 
from matched teacher-school data. Labour Economics, 14: 3, June, pp. 319-334 
Brown, W. E. (1973) Piecework bargaining. Heinemann, London. 
Caverley, Natasha; Cunningham, J. Barton; and MacGregor,  James N. (2007) Sickness 
Presenteeism, Sickness Absenteeism, and Health Following Restructuring in a Public Service 
Organization. Journal of Management Studies, 44: 2, March, pp. 304-319. 
CBI (2007) CBI Annual Absence Survey (various years), Confederation of British Industry, London. 
CIPD (2008) CIPD Absence Survey 2007, Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 
London. 
Coles, Melvyn G. and Treble, John G. (1996) Calculating the price of worker reliability Labour 
Economics, 3: 2, September, pp. 169-188 
Coles, Melvyn; Lanfranchi,  Joseph; Skalli, Ali; and Treble, John (2007) Pay, technology, and the 
cost of worker absence. Economic Inquiry, 45: 2, April, pp. 268-285. 
Conway, Neil and Briner, Rob. (2005) Understanding Psychological Contracts at Work: A Critical 
Evaluation of Theory and Research. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Crail, Mark (2007) Return-to-work interviews do cut sickness absence rates. Personnel Today, 
October, http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/2007/10/15/42807/return-to-work-
interviews-do-cut-sickness-absence-rates.html. 
de Witte, Hans (1999) Job Insecurity and Psychological Well-being: Review of the Literature and 
Exploration of Some Unresolved Issues. European Journal of Work & Organizational 
Psychology; June, 8: 2, p155-177 
Deery, Stephen J., and Erwin, Peter J., Iverson, Roderick D., and Ambrose, Margaret L (1995) The 
determinants of absenteeism: evidence from Australian blue-collar employees. International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 6: 4, Dec. pp. 825-848. 
Dionne, George, and Dostie, Benoit (2007) New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism 
Using Linked Employer-Employee Data. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, Oct, 61: 1, 
p108-120. 
Drago, Robert and Wooden, Mark (1992) The Determinants of Labor Absence: Economic Factors 
and Workgroup Norms across Countries. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45: 4, July, 
pp. 764-778. 
Edwards P, and Scullion H. (1982) The social organisation of industrial conflict: control and 
resistance in the workplace. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Greene, William H. (2003) Econometric analysis. (5th Edition) Pearson Education, NJ. 
Harrison, David A., and Martocchio, Joseph J. (1998) Time for Absenteeism: A 20-Year Review of 
Origins, Offshoots, and Outcomes. Journal of Management, 24: 3, pp. 305-350. 
Hill, J. M. and Trist, E. L. (1953) A consideration of industrial accidents as a means of withdrawal 
from the work situation: a study of their relation to other absences in an iron and steel works. 
 35 
Human Relations, 6: 4, pp. 357-396. 
Hill, J. M. and Trist, E. L. (1955) Changes in accidents and other absences with length of service: a 
further study of their incidence and relation to each other in an iron and steel works. Human 
Relations, 8: 2, pp. 121-152. 
Krause, Niklas; Dasinger, Lisa K., and Neuhauser, Frank (1998) Modified Work and Return to 
Work: A Review of the Literature. Journal of Occupational Rehabilitation, 8: 2, 
Lanfranchi, Joseph, and Treble, John (2008) Just-in-time Production, Work Organisation and 
Absence Control. Working Paper, University of Swansea. 
Luz J, and Green MS. (1997) Sickness absenteeism from work--a critical review of the literature. 
Public Health Reviews, 5: 2, pp. 89-122. 
Nicholson, Nigel and Johns, Gary (1985) The Absence Culture and the Psychological Contract-
Who's in Control of Absence? The Academy of Management Review, 10: 3, July,  pp. 397-407. 
Parsonage, Michael (2007) Mental Health at Work: Developing the business case. Policy Paper no. 
8. The Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, London 
Rousseau, Denise (1995) Psychological contracts in organisations: understanding written and 
unwritten agreements. Sage, Thousand Oaks, Ca. 
Shelly, J. (1993) Absence makes the costs go higher. HR Focus, 70: 8, Aug, p24. 
Willman, Paul; Bryson Alex, and Gomez, Rafael. (2006) The sound of silence: which employers 
choose no employee voice and why? Socio-Economic Review, 4: 2, pp.283-300 
Winkelmann R. (1999) Wages, firm size and absenteeism Applied Economics Letters, 6: 6, June, 
pp. 337-341. 
Wood, Stephen (2008) Job characteristics, employee voice and well-being in Britain. Industrial 
Relations Journal, 39: 2, March, pp.153-168. 
 
 
 
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
918 Richard Layard 
Guy Mayraz 
Stephen Nickell 
Does Relative Income Matter? Are the Critics 
Right? 
917 Ralf Martin 
Laure B. de Preux 
Ulrich J. Wagner 
The Impacts of the Climate Change Levy on 
Business: Evidence from Microdata 
916 Paul-Antoine Chevalier 
Rémy Lecat 
Nicholas Oulton 
Convergence of Firm-Level Productivity, 
Globalisation, Information Technology and 
Competition: Evidence from France 
915 Ghazala Azmat 
Nagore Iriberri 
The Importance of Relative Performance 
Feedback Information: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment using High School 
Students 
914 L Rachel Ngai 
Robert M. Samaniego 
Accounting for Research and Productivity 
Growth Across Industries 
913 Francesco Caselli 
Tom Cunningham 
Leader Behavior and the Natural Resource 
Curse 
912 Marco Manacorda 
Edward Miguel 
Andrea Vigorito 
Government Transfers and Political Support 
911 Philippe Aghion 
John Van Reenen 
Luigi Zingales 
Innovation and Institutional Ownership 
910 Fabian Waldinger Peer Effects in Science – Evidence from the 
Dismissal of Scientists in Nazi Germany 
909 Tomer Blumkin 
Yossi Hadar 
Eran Yashiv 
The Macroeconomic Role of Unemployment 
Compensation 
908 Natalie Chen 
Dennis Novy 
International Trade Integration: A 
Disaggregated Approach 
907 Dongshu Ou To Leave or Not to Leave? A Regression 
Discontinuity Analysis of the Impact of Failing 
the High School Exit Exam 
906 Andrew B. Bernard 
J. Bradford Jensen 
Stephen J. Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
The Margins of US Trade 
905 Gianluca Benigno 
Bianca De Paoli 
On the International Dimension of Fiscal 
Policy 
904 Stephen J. Redding Economic Geography: A Review of the 
Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
903 Andreas Georgiadis 
Alan Manning 
Change and Continuity Among Minority 
Communities in Britain 
902 Maria Bas Trade, Technology Adoption and Wage 
Inequalities: Theory and Evidence 
901 Holger Breinlich 
Chiara Criscuolo 
Service Traders in the UK 
900 Emanuel Ornelas 
John L. Turner 
Protection and International Sourcing 
899 Kosuke Aoki 
Takeshi Kimura 
Central Bank's Two-Way Communication with 
the Public and Inflation Dynamics 
898 Alan Manning 
Farzad Saidi 
Understanding the Gender Pay Gap: What’s 
Competition Got to Do with It? 
897 David M. Clark 
Richard Layard 
Rachel Smithies 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapy: 
Initial Evaluation of the Two Demonstration 
Sites 
896 Giorgio Barba Navaretti 
Riccardo Faini 
Alessandra Tucci 
Does Family Control Affect Trade 
Performance? Evidence for Italian Firms 
895 Jang Ping Thia Why Capital Does Not Migrate to the South: A 
New Economic Geography Perspective 
894 Kristian Behrens 
Frédéric Robert-Nicoud 
Survival of the Fittest in Cities: 
Agglomeration, Selection and Polarisation 
893 Sharon Belenzon 
Mark Schankerman 
Motivation and Sorting in Open Source 
Software Innovation 
892 Guy Michaels 
Ferdinand Rauch 
Stephen J. Redding 
Urbanization and Structural Transformation 
891 Nicholas Bloom 
Christos Genakos 
Ralf Martin 
Raffaella Sadun 
Modern Management: Good for the 
Environment or Just Hot Air? 
890 Paul Dolan 
Robert Metcalfe 
Comparing willingness-to-pay and subjective 
well- being in the context of non-market goods 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7284  Fax 020 7955 7595  Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
